Objectives:
To analyse and evaluate the changes made by the legislator to the provisions on the service of the first letter in a bailiff's case through the prism of the aim of the study and the postulates formulated in the doctrine.

Material and methods:
analytical and formal-dogmatic

Results:
The changes introduced should be assessed mainly negatively. The legislator did not decide to implement the most important demand of legal circles, i.e. did not introduce the return of the fiction of service for entities registered in CEIDG. The remaining changes still leave too much room for interpretation, which means that in the future it will inevitably be necessary to further amend these provisions to eliminate the arising ambiguities.

Conclusions:
Article 139 §21 in fine of the CPC deserves a positive assessment, which sanctions the unreliable conduct of the defendant consisting in the failure to disclose his current address for service in the register, so that he bears the costs of bailiff's service regardless of the outcome of the case. This provision is not fully precise, as it does not specify on whom the obligation to establish the domicile address of the defendant entered in the CEIDG rests. The changes with respect to specifying the subject-matter scope as well as the possibility for the court to make ex officio use of the knowledge of the domicile address of the defendant should be assessed neutrally in view of the fact that these provisions constitute a reflection of the court practice developed in these cases. The lack of reinstatement of the fiction of service on entities entered in the CEIDG should be assessed unequivocally negatively, which maintains a situation in which the right of the defendant to defence is excessively emphasised, pushing the plaintiff's right to a court to the sidelines.