

# SKILLS, ADMINISTRATION AND AGE MANAGEMENT: A CALL FOR INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEW MIGRANTS ARRIVING IN EUROPE

## ABSTRACT

Migration to the European Union from African and Asian countries are one of the key issues of the political and economic agenda of the second decade in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This paper studies the proposals concerning tools in the scope of skills, administration and age management, which will grant to newcomers the appropriate incentives needed for action. Erroneous institutions may lead to misguided incentives, rent seeking and migrants chasing unproductive activities, which in turn does not lead to the construction of a market economy. We posit that migration into Europe should be subject to programmes coordinated at the European level. Military action cannot stop the infiltration of millions more, which in turn means that managing the new arrivals should be coordinated at the EU level, and the tools of administration, skills management and age management should be actively used in selecting, including into the labour market and activating the job potential of migrants.

**KEYWORDS:** *migration, Europe, demography, age management, skills, administration management, immigration, policy*

## INTRODUCTION


the contemporary world and the changes we are seeing have led us to redefine many phenomena and their analysis in the context of current politics. One of these phenomena is migration bound for Europe, although we do

need to disclaim that this phenomenon has already been extensively studied in the past (Cesarani, Fulbrook, 2002; Lavenex, Uçarer, 2003; Pojmann, 2008; Thränhardt, 1992; Zincone et al., 2011). Europe has a long-standing tradition of humanism and universalism, which in turn exert pressure on the formal and informal institutions of its societies. Naturally there are also bases for the opposite views, albeit it has been humanism and universalism that have dominated Christian worldviews, wherein all people are created equal and their dignity is equally important. However, relevant elements of European thought, such as the ideals of freedom, i.e. liberalism, are in fact part of a European philosophy, but do not necessarily make up the core of worldviews shared by other civilizations from non-occidental cultures. This leads to misunderstandings, conflicts and pressures, at a time when Europeans and non-EU migrants interact more than ever before. This paper shall analyse the actions, in terms of skills, administration and age management aimed at migrants, that will help assimilates them and incorporate them into the European economy.

## **THE IMPORTANCE OF MIGRATION AND ITS MAIN TRENDS**

The subject of mass migration into the EU has become a key issue in Europe. Public opinion is very divided on this matter, so too is the political class. A significant part of society fears an invasion of foreign cultures, religions that are allegedly hostile towards Western values, while others rate migrants in a more positive framework, seeing in them the opportunity for continued development of European values, within the framework of multicultural Europe (Armbruster, Meinhof, 2011, Council of Europe, 2006; Tausch, 2008). Thanks to its recognition of the right to multiculturalism this movement in Europe is against „cultural imperialism”, wherein part of the public discourse contains perspectives that are far away from the mainstream. Nonetheless, migration is still a considerable issue facing Europe. Figure 1 shows the most important subjects for Europeans in 2015.

Figure 1.

**Most important challenges facing the EU in 2015**

Source: Eurobarometer (2015)















Migration is influenced by multiple economic, political and social factors. The causes and factors influencing migration can be found in the Lee model (1966, p. 47–57), and can be divided into the country of origin of the migrant (push factors) and those from the target country (pull factors). People migrate from places with less opportunities, lower wages, low quality of life, to places with significantly higher indices. In reality the wage disparity is a manifestation of the unfulfilled potential of the world economy, which would be activated only in a world of borderless exchange. According to the studies conducted by Michael Clemens, a border-free world would lead to the doubling of global GDP (Clemens, 2011; Clemens, 2013). The effect in turn would be much higher world production. The arrival of newcomers is akin to melt water in the spring, which powers the water mill in a quicker way, thus producing more energy. More tax paid by a larger number of workers means more funds for education, roads and infrastructure, increasing the efficiency and productivity of society as a whole.

Nevertheless negative response of immigration is based on the assumption that migrants are a burden and cost to a destination country (Cohen, Sirkeci, 2011, p. 99). Response varies depending on region of the Europe. East Europe

society is more hostile to foreigners compared to West Europe (Halpern, 2010). According to Spring Global Attitudes survey (2014) 86% people from Greece, 80% from Italy, 57% from France, 54% from UK, 47% from Spain, 44% from Germany, 40% Poles is saying their county should allow fewer immigrants to accept. It's is even more striking compared to opinions about immigrants (figure 2.).

Figure 2.

### Opinions about migrants based on survey


	Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs and social benefits		Immigrants in our country today are more to blame for crime than other groups	
Greece	70%		51%	
Italy	69%		45%	
France	52%		36%	
Poland	52%		21%	
Spain	46%		25%	
UK	37%		20%	
Germany	29%		48%	

Source: Spring Global Attitudes survey, 2014.

As opposed to popular wisdom new migrants do not take jobs away from host country citizens. Migrants, who usually hail from lower-income societies, are ready to work in jobs unattractive to locals. They have different and complementary skills in terms of what is offered locally, which is also another finding of studies on the subject<sup>1</sup>. If migrants were to steal jobs, the same would be true for each graduate leaving college and entering the labour market. In reality the opposite is true, as the economy expands, and the aggregate number of jobs available is increased, akin to the growth of a living organism. Today's worker is a potential entrepreneur tomorrow. Migration awakens economic forces that raise real wages in the entire economy and create pressure towards more education. Thus each member of society can benefit from the arrival of migrants and migration is the most efficient and largest programme of combating poverty ever known to man. Evidence of this can be found in the remittances from rich to poor countries. Figure 3 shows that unemployment of immigrants is only slightly higher than native-born.

Figure 3.

**Unemployment rates of foreign-born compared to native-born**



Note: Dataset based on 2012-2013 study

Source: OECD database, based on “Indicators of Immigrant Integration” study, 2015

## THE ECONOMIC DISCUSSION ON MIGRATION

Economic theories do not undermine the significance of demographics and human capital for the economy. For the EU migration is beneficial, as it guarantees the adequate allocation of resources, providing cheaper and more efficient labour, in turn boosting production and prosperity in the host country. The beneficial effects of migration in the host countries include demographic changes leading to a sustained/increasing population and stopping the ageing of populations through the net inward migration of young people, together with the possibility of harnessing the knowledge and experience of the migrants. Looking at migration through the lens of labour demand and supply, we can see that migration means a net increase in labour and the rise in the range and diversity of services and wages. Immigrants lower the price of many relatively simple services, which were conducted hitherto by relatively high-skills workers in their free time, who sometimes even had to forego paid work altogether, e.g. cleaning or caring for the elderly or children – thanks to migrants the return of highly-qualified women to the labour market is possible right after childbirth. In effect the economy's productivity rises. Newcomers do not seek high wages, which leads to lower production costs, and thus to dropping prices for goods and services. And when prices drop, demand increases – be it internal and external, due to the increased price competitiveness of exports. And these are not the only benefits. A larger population diminishes the relative price of public goods – public education, the army and bureaucracy. The host country loses out in the balance of payments, as part of the funds are remitted to countries of origins.

Adam Smith said that specialisation and the division of labour are essential to economic growth (Smith, 1954). Migration is a further supporter of these as it provides more labour, where it is needed and where it will be used most efficiently. Migration carries with it the untapped potential if and when migrants will have the right incentives to work and not rely on welfare. The newcomers are not helped by the fact that they oftentimes hail from countries where the authorities hamper entrepreneurship and promote religious or social intolerance or discrimination based on one's gender or views. Involuntarily, part of this reality, in the shape of formal and informal institutions, is carried over to their host countries. The role of host country

governments is to shape institutions and incentives in a way that leads newcomers to start working and not cultivate bad role models carried over from their homelands. This begs the question as to what type of migrants does Europe accept and what is the shape of the institutions that influence new EU migrants.

## **EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHY IN CRISIS. MIGRATION AS A SOLUTION**

The total number of people deciding to migrate has only slightly changed in relation to total world population, however it does seem that in recent years this phenomenon has become more relevant. Specifically in Europe, where institutions make up the system known as the European Social Model, with large social outlays, a large role of the state in the economy, and low fertility rates of the member states (Prokurat, 2010). UE has a system of welfare entitlements, which is one of the most important reasons that Europe is attracting so many immigrants (Prokurat, 2011). Faced with low levels of population growth and the linked phenomenon of population ageing, the role of international migration in shaping the state and structure of societies is greatly increased. Very high levels of immigration are projected for the years ahead in Europe.

Demographic analyses show that not only European but worldwide fertility rates are plummeting, while at the local level, and on great areas of the globe, populations are experiencing zero or negative growth (Bongaarts, 2009, p. 2985–2990). In 1985 to 1990 world fertility rate averaged 3.4 children per woman. In 1996 this number felled to 3.0 and in 2006 dropped 2.8 (Jones, Lopez, 2006). In many countries fertility rate is below replacement value (2.1 children). From the 1980s in almost all European Union member states there is statistically less than two children per woman in her reproductive age. The current level of demographic growth thus does not guarantee the biological maintenance of European societies. Demographic prognostics together with the structure and needs of the European economy suggest that in order to maintain the current level of socio-economic development, by 2050 Europe must have attracted around 150 million migrants, with their proportion attains levels as high as 20% of their host populations (Kamusella, 2003, p. 42-45).

Figure 4.  
**Summary of data regarding migrants in UE in 2015**

UE country	Total amount of migrants	Immigrants from outside of EU	Migrants as a % of society
Austria	1057k	539k	12,4%
Belgium	1264k	434k	11,3%
Bulgaria	45k	41k	0,8%
Croatia	32k	21k	0,7%
Cyprus	159k	48k	18,6%
Czech Rep.	434k	261k	4,1%
Denmark	397k	233k	7,1%
Estonia	195k	187k	14,8%
Finland	207k	122k	3,8%
France	4157k	2706k	6,3%
Germany	7011k	3912k	8,7%
Great Britain	5047k	2424k	7,8%
Greece	837k	649k	7,7%
Hungary	140k	59k	1,4%
Ireland	545k	171k	11,8%
Italy	4922k	3480k	8,1%
Latvia	305k	299k	15,2%
Lithuania	21k	16k	0,7%
Luxembourg	249k	34k	45,3%
Malta	25k	11k	5,9%
Netherlands	735k	330k	4,4%
Poland	101k	71k	0,3%
Portugal	401k	301k	3,8%
Romania	73k	52k	0,4%
Slovakia	59k	12k	1,1%
Slovenia	97k	80k	4,7%
Spain	4677k	2685k	10,1%
Sweden	687k	385k	7,1%

Source: data based on Eurostat (2015).




The demographic crisis leads to accelerated population ageing. People over 50 make up over a third of the EU's population. In terms of individual countries the situation is even more drastic. According to estimates by the UN and Council of Europe, as early as 2030–2035 Germany and Italy will see these age brackets making up as much as 40% (European Commission, 2002). Currently there are many European countries feeling the lack of workers. Furthermore, the proportion of working age to retired persons are changing for the worse. Currently the European average is three economically active people for one retired person and according to Eurostat it will be one and half active for one retired in 2030. The proportion of people of working age in the EU-28 is shrinking while the relative number of those retired is expanding (Eurostat, 2016). Thus the contemporary social security model will be impossible to sustain. Also the healthcare and social sectors are facing collapse. Mathers et al. show that life expectancy has risen on par with the general health of populations, which in turn permits a longer working career to offset longevity (Mathers et al., 2001, p. 1685–1691). Therefore, while life expectancy has increased, the period at the end of life, where individuals only consume and do not generate income, has remained stable. According to Eurostat, by 2025 the number of working age people in the EU will shrink by 52 million. Taking into consideration population ageing (figure 3) it's clear that Europe has to find a remedy for that challenge.

Ageing populations suffer three kinds of deficits. First of all they witness a shortage of benefits. The second problem is the diminished creativity of a society. Thirdly the savings rate plummets, as the elderly spend their life's savings. Thus EU acceptance of immigration and legal employment of workers from outside the EU will become the remedy for this ageing problem. Therefore it is essential to regulate this issue at the European level.

In 2015 situation is tense as European Union received 832.000 migrants via the Mediterranean Sea. That is four times more than in 2014, when over 200.000 arrived<sup>1</sup>. Not all rich countries, including European Union members, are interested in accepting all groups of migrants. Some countries focus on highly skilled workers and try to prevent unskilled migrant labour to enter

thir market. Nevertheless, last decade has seen the flourishing of illegal people smuggling in into the EU, dominated by organised crime mainly from Southern and Eastern Europe. According to the International Office on Migration, most migrants crossed the EU border in Spain, Greece and Italy and came to the EU from war zones such as Syria, Eritrea and Afghanistan. Others hail from Libya, Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia and Iraq. Thus it is very important to monitor these migration flows by and foster monitoring and control actions, while putting into force policies that include immigrants management in order for them to benefit all parties.

Figure 5.  
**Population ageing in Europe 1950-2015. Data aggregated from countries in different regions of Europe; (in % of population)**



Source: UN World Population prospects (2015).

## THE NEED FOR SKILLS, ADMINISTRATION AND AGE MANAGEMENT FOR MIGRANTS

Integration should be seen as a long term and multi-factored process aimed at a situation where migrants are fully fledged members of the host society. The end effects may vary depending on factors such as age, gender, education and proximity to the host culture. These features should determine the preparation of effective programmes and integration mechanisms, also conditioning the time needed for those to succeed, taking into consideration profile of the migrant from outside of UE (figure 3) and age of asylum seeker (figure 4). Based on the data we can estimate that average newcomer to UE is young man.

Figure 6.

**Profile of migrants arriving in Europe**Source: data base on UNHCR database, 2015




Figure 7.

**Average age of asylum seekers in EU**

Age group	Share of asylum seekers	
0-13	18,1%	
14-17	8,3%	
18-34	55%	
35-64	18%	
65 or older	0,6%	

Source: Eurostat (2015), based on 688.065 migrants from outside of UE.

The challenges arising from the influx of migrants are not solely limited to logistics, but primarily with their integration, which should commence right after their arrival. The Integration is a two way process, thus changes affect both migrants and the host society. The influx of migrants poses a challenge to the state and its institutions, but also to society itself. It seeks systemic solutions, which entails budgetary spending. This is primarily accommodation for migrants, legalising their stay, and also starting their integration programmes. Pre-integration programmes encompass language courses and social and job orientation. Migrants should also be supported in their entry onto the labour market. In the case of highly skilled workers this means validating their diplomas and qualifications, and in the case of low skill workers – courses and training sessions, that answer to the needs of the labour market and raise the chance of obtaining a job. Voluntary migrants most often settle in large cities. This can be linked to the creation of ethnic ghettos, which hampers the process of adaptation and assimilating the rules of the host country. The next issue is educating children, who should be incorporated into the local educational system, in order to avoid backlogs preferably with a teacher who speaks their language. Very often additional language courses are applied.

The host society also requires reinforcement of institutions as there is rise in uncertainty in human relations and lack of understanding. The influx of migrants is linked to rising tensions in the society which has strong links to certain cultural and national identities, including the rise of racism and xenophobia. People are not easily accept other cultures. The influx of migrants is to part of the society linked with weaker national traditions, a destabilised public order that threatens the economic welfare of individuals, as migrants are seen as threats to the order of things. Thus their arrival also causes changes in the host society. Constructing correct relations with migrants requires formal and informal institutions that allow accepting otherness – people from other cultures, other nationalities, other religions. The experiences of Western European countries show that the effects of these programmes can only be seen in the second generation (Prokurat, Fabisiak, 2018).

The current situation calls for the management of migration, well beyond individual countries and societies. Undertaking topic of management of

migration should be done in accordance with basic migration experience model. A migrant in his new place of stay undergoes a process of acculturation, according to J. Berry, which includes four options (Berry, 1992): first, the migrant retains his culture and accepts the host culture, resulting in ‘adaptation’. Second, the migrant retains his culture and rejects the values of the host country, resulting in ‘isolation’. Third, the migrant negates his culture and accepts the host culture, resulting in ‘assimilation’. Four, the migrant negates his culture and that of the host country, resulting in ‘marginalisation’. The second and fourth options are worse for functioning in the new society.

Figure 8.  
**Skills, Age and Administration management policies required to be undertaken**

Integration area	Actions taken
Skills management	Language courses offered to incomers Educational policy for incoming migrants Institutions that will enable job activation for migrants Selecting migrant skills and creating migrant categories, depending on their social utility. Creating a database with skills needed on European market Trainings on the local labour market
Age management	Evaluating the possibility of working given the experience and health of the migrant Evaluating work preferences according to: gender, age, experience. Using age management tools for migrants
Administration management	Administration of migration studies for the bureaucracy Anti-discrimination policy on the labour and housing markets Preventing the formation of ghettos Institutions aimed at migrants (branches of migration offices, information points and family help) Information materials in the migrants’ language Personnel in the public institutions trained in helping migrants and speaking their language Loan institutions for migrants Legal advice for migrants Cultural training for migrants Family unity policies

Source: author’s compilation

## EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION MONITORING POLICIES AND ACTIONS

First promigration actions have been undertaken by the EU in the early 1990s, when the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties identified the concept of European citizenship, together with passages on the common visa policies and the aims of the Schengen area. The next important step were the recommendations from the Council of Europe summit in Tampere in 1999 (Oudenaren, 2005, p. 246). They touched on the common border policies and asylum policies as part of the creation of the „European area of freedom, safety and justice” (Molle, 2006, p. 105). At the same time relevant passages about cooperation with third parties on migration also appeared in European law-making. Currently the migration process and preventing illegal migration is carried out with tools that enable the EU to implement its goals. Two new systems stand out from these: the Visa Information System (VIS), containing information on visas granted and its exchange between member states; and the Schengen Information System (SIS and SIS II) that contains data on missing persons and objects (Balzacq, 2006). Both systems foresee the exchange of information between countries. Also in place is the European Border Monitoring System – Eurosur, whose aim is to seal EU borders, limit the numbers of illegal migrants, improving the security of EU states, by preventing drug, arms and human trafficking. Another institution tasked with these aims is Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) that works closely with the European Police Agency. According to European law external border countries are responsible for accepting, registering and processing applications from migrants and for their care until such time of their acceptance.

Up to now the common migration policy of the EU has not had much success. The common policies passed required the least amount of changes possible from all member states. On the one hand this strategy allows for slow adaptation, on the other it does not allow to manage crises facing Europe since the start of the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A lack of complex and standardised procedures is not the only weakness of European migration policy. The other is a lack of external border security. It is essential

to coordinate policy, which would enable the long-term prevention of illegal immigration and accepting the right people. There is ongoing discussion on EU policies that might be referred to as “European Programme for Migrations” and will undertake topics mentioned in this article<sup>1</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

Europe requires a new, consistent and consequent policy on migration. This calls for the use of policies and practise already available including age management, skills and administration management for migrants. All agents must be involved: member states, EU institutions, international organisations, civic society, local governments and third countries should work together so that a common EU migration policy may come into being. The EU must work in a holistic way on strengthening external borders, efficiently differentiating between refugees and economic migrants, also unskilled and highly skilled newcomers. If Europe is not able to cope with the wave of migrants from the Middle East and Africa, it will run the risk of returning to internal border controls, with populists taking power and the successes of the EU project may be reverted. Individual member states have problems with population ageing and the looming entitlement reform (retirement funds, social systems) and so demographic change in the EU may, in the long run, hamper economic growth. Immigration can mitigate the impact of the demographic shift, particularly if migrants are mostly younger working-age people who are motivated to work. Some welfare arrangements in Europe noticeably need wide-ranging recalibration

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## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Data taken from: International Organization For Migration ([www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)), 2016.
- <sup>2</sup> Additionally, more information can be read in: Kasnitz P., Mollenkopf J., Holdaway J., Waters M. (2008), *Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age*, New York; also: Nibbs F., Brettell C. (2016), *Identity and the Second Generation: How Children of Immigrants Find Their Space*, Nashville.
- <sup>3</sup> COM(2015), 240.