

JOURNAL OF MODERN SCIENCE



JoMS 4/19/2013, ss. 159-185

HALUK ÖZDEMİR

LEGACY OF THE INTEGRATION STRATEGY AND THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Haluk Özdemir

Kırıkkale University,
Department of International Relations
halukmail@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT

This article outlines the main logic and dynamics behind European integration and the historical conditions that created it. This is fundamental to understand the working of the EU, crises it experiences and the future of integration. One of the main goals of the article is to emphasize the conditions that shaped the thoughts of the founding fathers of the EU, and the general approach towards solving Europe's problems, following WWII. First, the German factor in European history is highlighted for a better understanding of European logic of integration. Then, strategies such as prioritization of economic interests over the political ones, selective forgetting and selective remembering, focusing on small details to achieve significant results, legal problem solving for political issues, and emphasizing soft power approaches, besides ideas like pluralism, are discussed. Here, a special emphasis was placed on the strategy of using crises as opportunities to diminish state sovereignty for the sake of integration. The last part of the article contrasts the integrative logic with the current state of mind in Europe and discusses the problems caused by the departure from the European logic, especially in recent decades. In that context, the status of Turkey and the problems it faces in the accession process are elaborated as an exemplary case with an emphasis on the Cyprus issue.

KEY WORDS:

Europe, integration, Germany, Turkey, Cyprus, soft power, pluralism, nationalism

INTRODUCTION

Europe went through radical changes in the years following the WWII. If one had to make a distinction between the post-war years and the Eu-

European history before that, the main point of reference would be the European Union. Since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first building stone for the European Union, the interstate relations in Europe have been based on cooperation and more importantly, integration. Previously, the European state-system was known for its own invention of balance of power. Today, no state in Europe is concerned with such balance in its classical sense. Today, people in Europe talk more about economy, employment, global competition, technology, international traveling and cooperation rather than balance of power. We witness a successful synchronization and harmony of national interests.

How did the Europeans transform international politics among themselves successfully into more peaceful relations? The commonly known assumptions of the realist theory contain hypotheses about the anarchic nature of international relations, conflict of interests among nations, state security and military threats. However, researches about the European politics in the past half-century provide little evidence of such pessimistic and security-based realist assumptions.

Transformation of European politics is both startling and full of lessons for other parts of the world. In order to draw lessons out of the European experience, a detailed glance back at the European history and political culture, and an effort to trace the clues of this transformation is necessary. European history in general has been marked with violent conflicts and bloodshed rather than peace. Racism, nationalism and colonialism, all have been the European inventions that shaped the last few centuries, and none of those political inventions can be related to the idea of peace. So, how did the European achieve such a peaceful coexistence, cooperation and integration? We can have a better understanding of past progresses and today's problems, only if we can understand what convinced the nation-states to share their sovereign rights, for which they had fought wars.

The main goal of this article is first, to explain the way of thinking behind European integration and then make an evaluation of recent years. Such evaluation is especially needed, because the new generation of Europeans takes the integration and the EU for granted. The whole integration project was built on the sorrows and toils of the European people. If we do not understand the logic behind this integration and transformation process, we can easily lose it. If we do not draw the necessary lessons from it, the history can repeat itself. Most of the time, it is much easier to destroy something than to build it. European integration is such a delicate

construct that we need to examine it both for understanding the nature of its success and for its exemplary nature for other regions.

In so doing, first we need to define the main components of what I call here “the European logic,” (Özdemir, 2012) which created a political, social and economic transformation of Europe at a continental scale. Remembrance of the logic behind the process of European transformation, which has created the EU, is an absolute necessity for preserving peace and stability in the region. This is especially needed for new generation Europeans who are starting to forget the economic and political conditions that inspired the founding fathers of the integration movement. Having done that, we will briefly look into the contemporary problems especially concerning enlargement issues and the economic crisis, all of which are related to the logic of integration and departure from that logic.

The main assumption of this article is that most of the problems that Europeans are facing today are stemming from the divergence from the integrative logic. This divergence both creates certain problems and hinders possible solutions. In order to sustain the process of peace and integration in Europe, the legacy of integrative logic needs to be remembered and reinstated. For the sake of peace, stability and economic prosperity in Europe, this integrative mentality has to be preserved and embraced by the decision makers.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE INTEGRATION STRATEGY

The European logic of integration refers to a way of thinking about European politics and its supranational nature, which emerged in Europe after the WWII. The most concrete outcome of this logic is the European Union (EU). The success or failure of this logic will have serious political consequences, because the EU integration is only one of the several European projects, and this way of thinking is not embraced or shared by all Europeans. Europe has a rich tradition of political thoughts, and almost with no exception, every tradition has its own project of Europe.

Thus, there are several alternative understandings of Europe. Even the fascist and nationalists have their own projects, which are mostly in opposition to the liberal vision of the EU. For example, as opposed to the pluralist EU project, fascist projects envision more homogenous social structures, based on anti-immigrationist policies and an imagination of a racially purified Europe with no immigrants. Such projects feed on the

weaknesses and failures of the “European logic.”

Therefore, European logic refers to a specific economic and political project. This logic is peculiar to the conditions emerged after the WWII, and has created the EU at the end of an approximately half a century-long process. Failure of this project will strengthen its alternatives, which do not promise a future that matches Europe’s own pluralistic nature.

The first outcome of the European logic was the Coal and Steel Community. Later, it took the form of the European Economic Community (EEC), which was the precursor of the European Union. The whole process started with 6 countries, reached to 27, and the number is still growing. This multi-dimensional transformation has become possible due to a sustained approach and consistent strategies towards integration. The founding fathers, such as Jean Monnet, formulated a coherent strategy to start an integration process between the countries that had fought the bloodiest wars against each other. The transition from conflict and competition to integration required long-term strategies based on a clear vision about Europe. The main challenge in this process was the creation of common interests among different countries. Those interests had to be very clear and commanding so that integration would be viewed inevitable.

One of the interesting aspects of European integration is that not only did it form a union of many countries out of common values and shared ideals, but also, and perhaps more than that, it was based on common problems. In other words, the thing that brought all these countries together was their common problems rather than their overlapping interests. Under usual circumstances, any attempt in explaining any kind of cooperation focuses on common interests. But the European experience can better be explained through common problems.

It is possible to summarize the legacy of integrative thinking under certain themes. The first theme is *the German factor*. The short-term goal of the first integration enterprises was to provide security guarantees against possible German belligerence. The proposed solution was to *emphasize common economic interests* rather than focusing on confrontational political concerns. In order to do that, the European statesmen after the war had to build a new Europe on *pluralist values*. This new Europe needed a new political culture, but the recent history provided no such culture, but only conflict and bloodshed. The success of this project had to be based on a strategy of *selective forgetting and selective remembering*. Forgetting the unpleasant experiences, such as fascism, Nazism, racism, colonialism, and

communism, on one hand, and remembering and emphasizing democratic values, pluralism, freedom and free market economy on the other, was the main strategy. Since this strategy would face fierce political opposition from the nationalist projects, it had to create accumulative outcomes and try to *produce significant results out of small details*. As a new political approach, the European logic seeks for *legal and institutional solutions even for the hard-core political problems*. This institutional/legal approach has transformed European politics and channeled it into less confrontational and more cooperative strategies. This approach reflected on Europe's external relations as well, in that Europeans *focused on their soft power* rather than violence. Through the development of all these strategies, the European logic *provides lessons for other conflict-ridden regions*, and is viewed as *an example for other parts of the world to follow*. The European logic also offers a strategy for political transformation, which is *utilizing crises as opportunities for radical change*. Now, we need to take a closer look at all these components of the European legacy.

THE GERMAN FACTOR

In European history, the lingering choice has been between “a Europeanized Germany, or Germanized Europe.” This issue can be traced back to the Thirty Year Wars, but appeared in European politics mainly after the unification of Germany in 1871. The German problem became more prominent in the following years and dominated international politics in Europe during the years of both world wars. Hitler's attempt to Germanize Europe, and the previous initiatives for German domination in the continent run into a stiff opposition of other states.

After defeating Germany, victorious powers tried to solve the problem by putting extreme pressure on German state to keep it under control. The embodiments of this strategy were the Treaty of Versailles after the WWI and the Morgenthau Plan after the WWII. The former placed heavy war reparations on Germany and the latter attempted to disassemble and remove all German industry. The Morgenthau Plan was based on the strategy to solve the German problem, once and for all, through turning it into an agrarian country (Chase, 1952). The main approach in both solutions was that Germany had to be ostracized and put under constant and extreme pressure, in order to prevent Europe from being Germanized.

Robert Schuman was one of the first people who saw that those strate-

gies would eventually fail. Europe needed another solution, which would be more in line with the nature of European politics. Germany was just too big and too strong to be ignored or to be restrained. Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Walter Hallstein's approach was based on the idea of "a Europeanized Germany."

A Europeanized Germany would be the main safeguard against the Germanized Europe. Instead of trying to contain it, accepting Germany into the system would create a more viable solution for the European problems. This approach was the main spark behind the idea of European integration. In that, failing to integrate would mean further disasters in the future. Therefore the Europeans had to make any sacrifice necessary (including certain sovereign rights) in order to make the new system work.

Even today, it is impossible to understand the main dynamics of integration without grasping the significance of German factor in European politics (for a more detailed discussion of German factor in Europe (Bachoff, 1999)). The whole idea of integration emerged out of the German factor, which still influences contemporary developments in Europe. For example, the 2004 enlargement strategy was partly shaped by the fear of Germany leaving the union and turning to the historical ambitions of Mitteleuropa. In the early 1990s, the political environment was favoring a strong Germany to dominate Eastern Europe, which had been recently freed from the communist rule. This looked like a viable option for the reunified Germany after the Cold War.

In that environment, the fears of a Germanized Europe were revived once again. Under normal circumstances, the EU would not accept so many countries as new members all at once. There is no other example of enlargement wave, which is that large, and most probably there will be none in the future. The main reason for the EU to take such a risky step in her enlargement policy was the German factor, that is to say "keeping Germany European."

PRIORITIZING ECONOMIC INTERESTS OVER THE POLITICAL ONES

International politics in Europe is distinguished from other parts of the world. We can identify several distinctive aspects of it, but the most prominent one that represents the integrative logic is the priority of economic interests. This is very different from the traditional international politics. In traditional international politics, a general classification of problems

into matters of high and low politics implies an order of significance. The matters of high politics are usually about political, military and security issues. Low politics issues concern economic and technical matters. In that order, political and military issues have always been more prioritized than the economic ones.

However, Europeans reversed this order of importance. Today, in Europe economy comes first and even national sovereignty can be compromised for economic interests. Starting with the post-World War years, the matters of high and low politics slowly and gradually exchanged their positions of priority. Even Germany and France had to put their political rivalry aside to regain their economic power. Economic reconstruction of Europe was the main concern for others as well. “An economic thinking” was slowly taking place of the power politics in Europe. [The term “economic thinking” was first used by N. Angell in 1910 to emphasize the increasing importance of economic matters in industrial age, as opposed to purely political matters. For Angell, as a result of this new thinking every policy would have to take its economic consequences into account (Angell, 2007)]. This process was so slow that we can only notice that radical change when we look back in history and compare European politics both with its own past and with other regions.

The most recent and striking examples of this new politics have been Italy and Greece. During the European economic crisis, Greek and Italian governments were forced to resign because of the austerity measures. In order to receive their bail out packages, they had to follow the EU policy requirements. What is so interesting about these resignations is that people in these countries accepted the un-elected new governments. Mario Monti in Italy and Lucas Papademos in Greece were to handle new economic policies. Both of them were former EU employees. Papademos was the vice President of the European Central Bank (2002-2010) and Mario Monti was a member of the Commission (1999-2004). Papademos government was in office for 6 months until the elections, while Monti government is still in office. This was a revolutionary development that went largely unnoticed.

Firstly, with these resignations, the EU showed its political power to change governments in two member countries. This was an unprecedented crossover for economic and political issues concerning the European integration. The EU had never before attempted or accomplished such political intervention. Secondly and more importantly, people accepted this political and economic coup. This can be interpreted as an infringement of

the classical sovereign rights. For that reason, we can easily conclude that the EU has changed the meaning of state sovereignty, and continues to do so. In the face of these imposed measures, people were mostly obedient because of the fact that they would receive national bailout packages in exchange for their compliance.

In brief, the EU now can intervene in domestic political affairs of its members for economic reasons. Moreover, people are willing to obey these interventions because of their economic expectations. All of these points to a radical change in political priorities in Europe. Anywhere else in the world and in old Europe, people do not sacrifice their sovereign rights for economic benefits. But in new Europe, the whole purpose of integration was to prioritize economic interests over the political ones; thence people would not go to war over their conflicting political interests. Instead, they were united on the basis of common economic interests. At the end we can easily conclude that this way of thinking prevails in Europe, and the whole integration idea is based on prioritized economic welfare over political conflict.

PLURALISM

There is no other continent as small as Europe and cramped with so many different countries. Europe is a small continent comprised of multitudinous countries compressed in a small geographical space with profound political differences. All major religions are represented in Europe and almost all ideologies emerged out of Europe. All these ideologies still have their believers. Europe also sustains national and ethnic variety. In the past, all projects and ideologies that had ignored this pluralistic nature caused massive human pain and misery.

On this continent, people fought wars over their differences throughout centuries. But the European logic is in the process of changing all this. The main purpose here is to create a Europe that is more in line with its own pluralistic nature. After the WWII, people saw that peace, prosperity and stability in Europe are possible only through acceptance this diverse nature. Now, Europeans are learning how to accept their differences and cooperate with each other. This only became possible through the prevailing logic of Europe. The past conflicts over differences did not benefit any European country, but only paved the road for decline of Europe in world politics.

According to the integrative logic, differences are viewed not as threats to be eliminated, but cultural values contributing to a common European family of cultures. Fascism and racism were the projects of eliminating cultural differences and caused social disasters in Europe. Now, instead of fighting for national identities and differences, the new way of thinking suggests accepting, preserving and embracing dissimilarities. Pluralism in this thinking is not a threat, but a value to promote. This attitude is formulated in the EU's motto of "unity in diversity."

SELECTIVE FORGETTING AND SELECTIVE REMEMBERING

European history is a story of both intellectual progress on one hand, and cultural destruction on the other. A student of European history can find plenty of examples of both kinds. Therefore, finding a common cultural or political ground for integration is not an easy enterprise. A common European culture and identity has to be fabricated. This cultural fabrication involves a selection process. Since Europe has rich cultural traditions, a wide range of creations is possible out of different combinations. This is one of the most important reasons for the existence of diverse political projects of Europe.

The European logic is one and the most prominent of these European projects. It is a project of creating a common European identity out of rich cultural and political traditions. It selects and emphasizes certain cultural traits such as democracy, pluralism and political freedom, while forgets, trivializes and pushes some others into background. Among those excluded experiences we can cite Nazism, fascism, colonialism and genocidal policies in European colonies. European experience includes examples of all, but today's Europe is based on selected components. The European logic wants to create a Europe of its own imagination and political vision.

Here, we are not talking about the hypocritical selectiveness, but a pragmatic and principled refinement of forgetting and remembering. Zygmunt Bauman calls such identities that are based on conscious forgetting and cognizant remembering, "the palimpsest identities" (Bauman, 1997). In this way, the history of social, political and cultural experiences are rewritten, and new cooperative experiences are encouraged through emphasizing common interests, creating a common identity.

European values include democracy, free market economy, liberal values and freedoms, but also racism, fascism, communism, genocide, co-

lonialism and so forth. What the integration movement is trying to do is selectively re-forming the European value system. This process involves forgetting certain things while emphasizing others.

FOCUSING ON SMALL DETAILS TO CREATE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS

Change does not come easy, especially if it involves radical transformation. Altering the centuries-long political habits requires a prudent strategy. In that respect, the strategy of the integration elites has exemplary features. Those elites knew that they needed patience for overcoming nationalist reflexes in the face of sovereignty-sharing initiatives. Endeavors for building a new Europe, would eventually has to face the challenge of sovereignty. Overcoming this huge sovereignty obstacle, they designed their integration strategy as a learning process, where people learned how to share sovereign authorities for common benefits.

Integration moved with small steps, but each small step convinced people for the necessity of a new political approach. Each new step has created reasons for newer small steps. At the end, when we look at the historical development of integration, we can clearly identify this strategy. The radical difference between the Coal and Steel Community of 1950s and the EU of 2000s became possible in time, as a result of these accumulative small and modest steps.

Instead of confronting the sovereignty concerns directly, integration started with restricted authorities in limited fields, and worked through accumulative practices. For example, a joint administration of coal and steel sectors is a small step considering the long-term goal of a European federation. But those little steps accumulated to be the European Union. In 1977, Roy Jenkins, president of the Commission, explained this strategy with these words: “Let us think of a long-jumper. He starts with a rapid succession of steps, lengthens his stride, increases his momentum, and then makes his leap. The creation of a monetary union would be a leap of this kind.” (Jenkins, 1977). Nobody knew in 1950s that the Coal and Steel Community would turn into today’s EU with economic and monetary union, in which common foreign policy and even defense policy are set as new goals.

SEEKING FOR LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS EVEN FOR THE HARD-CORE POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Transformation of international politics in Europe has multiple dimensions. It requires a different and completely new mindset. In traditional international politics, core national interests are defended, if needed, with military measures, and they are not subjects of bargaining. For example, before the integrationist logic was at work in Europe, nobody had ever thought that the Alsace-Lorraine Issue or the threat of Nazism, or any other political problem in Europe would have been solved through institutional or legal methods. It would be a naive approach to assume such solution. But at the end of the integration process, the whole political environment has been transformed.

Today, the European logic assumes that there is no problem than cannot be solved through institutional/legal approach.[For discussions of Europe's normative approaches look (Manners,2002). Like the Franco-German issue at the beginning, Europeans think that every problem can be solved through institutional arrangements based on common understanding. After all, the Franco-German problems, going centuries back in European history, were solved not through traditional political methods or military measures, but through a new logic of integration. The new approach has proven to be more effective than the traditional balance of power methods in solving ossified problems such as the Franco-German tensions.

This new approach also is valid in explaining Europe's external relations. Encouraged by the success in Europe, the Europeans are convinced that the same approach can work in relations with other actors in other regions. Even though criticized from time to time, this approach is adopted in a range of issues spreading from the conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus to the Arab Spring and to the nuclear stance with Iran.

FOCUSING AND EMPHASIZING THE SOFT POWER

Hard power, and specifically the military power, was at the heart of the process of European powers' rise and fall in world politics. During the geographical discoveries and the colonization process following these discoveries, the European influence was carried out through military power. The wealth and power provided by the resources brought from the colonies accelerated the European rise in world politics.

But at the end of the 19th century, the whole world was colonized and

there was no other piece of land to confiscate. The limits of colonization marked a significant turn in world history. The heating competition and scarcity of new colonies, especially after the national unification of Germany and Italy, brought military conflicts into the European continent. The European states turned their military technologies, which had rapidly and steadily developed after the industrial revolution, against each other. The Great War and then the WWII laid the grounds for swift decline of Europe in world politics. Military power that quickly raised Europe in world politics also caused its swift decline.

The lesson learnt from these experiences was that any use of military power within Europe would mean self-destruction. Therefore, the rules of engagement would have to be based on soft power politics, not on military might (Michalski,2005). This lesson emphasized the significance of cooperation, communication, and bargaining. For example, in the beginning, controlling Germany was achieved not through suppression, force and inhibition, but through persuasion, enticement, and soft power of common ideals. The soft power has proven to be more effective in solving the German problem. After building peace in Europe, Europeans became more aware of the power of soft power in their relations with the outside world as well.

The progress of integration is most visible in enlargement process. Today, the EU is the main center of attraction in the region. The EU turns this attraction into a matter of soft power through its enlargement policy. Thanks to the enlargement strategy, the EU asserts more power in her neighboring regions than any other actor, even though it has no significant military power.

However, soft power has proven to be more effective in some circumstances. The progress reports, published every year about each candidate country, are major sources of this political soft power. In these reports, the EU tells the candidates what to do and what not to do even in their domestic politics. No other actor can intervene in these countries' domestic affairs as much as the EU. Ole Waever, calls this power of the EU as "silent disciplining power" (Waever, 1995) .

Focusing on soft power, which is more in line with the European logic, both contributed to European security, and once again enabled the Europeans to exert influence in world politics. This is why the European logic is mainly based on the use of soft power and against military or other coercive uses. In that sense it is possible to argue that Europeans were able

escape the anarchic nature of international politics and its hard-power dominated relations (Kagan, 2003).

EUROPE AS A LESSON FOR ITSELF AND FOR OTHERS

After almost half a century later, the integration movement in Europe has created an area of peace and stability. This situation poses a major challenge for the theories of international politics based on the assumptions of anarchic environment and power politics. The inventor of power politics, Europe, changed the rules of the game once again. Now, the Europeans believe that this can be possible in other parts of the world as well (Coppieters, Emerson, Huysseune, 2004). For that reason, they promote their ideals, institutions and economic systems in other regions by using enlargement procedures and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Through economic aid programs and European soft power, the European logic and way of thinking has a tendency to see itself as a model for other regions (Coppieters, Huysseune, Emerson, Tocci & Vahl, 2003). They promote their problem-solving methods and spread their value systems like liberal democracy, minority rights and individual freedom etc.

It is possible to assume that the Europeans were successful in solving their problems because those problems are not as complicated as the ones, for example, in the Middle East. This assumption might sound reasonable when we look at the situation today. However, Franco-German problem did not look so easy to solve in 1945 either. It had deep historical roots that caused a series of wars, including two world wars. Indeed, the political problems in Europe were not easy to solve and they were deep-rooted. Therefore, the Europeans assume that their approach can solve even the deepest and oldest conflicts, if it is given a chance and shown patience for. In that process, it is believed that the EU can make significant contribution to conflict resolution in regional problems (Diez, Stetter, Albert, 2006).

CRISES AS OPPORTUNITIES

As we all know the integration was born out of one of the biggest crises in European history. The aftermath of the WWII completely destroyed European supremacy in world politics. We can identify at least two major crises in these years. The first one is about the Franco-German relations. The tensions between two countries led to two world wars, and there were no sign of solution for the problem in 1945. Germans were not happy with

the international inspections and international authority over her strategic sectors such as coal and steel. The French on the other hand was not happy with the fact that those inspections were not tight enough. In other words, Germans were not happy because of the inspections, and French were not pleased because of the fading surveillance system. It looked like there was no easy solution for the crisis, nothing was new in European politics, and it was business-as-usual.

The second crisis was about the whole political system. This crisis concerned the international system of nation-states. Starting with the French Revolution, nation-states and their ideology, nationalism, have promised people freedom, equality, peace, and prosperity. However, in practice, the result was wars, bloodshed, and misery. One of the prominent European federalists, Altiero Spinelli, published a pamphlet with Ernesto Rossi in 1941, titled *Ventotene Manifesto* (Spinelli, Rossi, 2003, s. 3-6) concerning the twentieth century political crisis. They offered federalism as a solution to the crisis of nation-state. The first part of the manifest, titled “the Crisis of the Modern Civilization,” was about this crisis.

The only way out of these crises was transcending the nation-state model and creating a new form of governance. As a result of this line of argument, the ideas of integration and federalism came to the fore. Thus, the embryo for the European logic was formed within the context of the crisis of nation-states in general, and the Franco-German crisis in particular.

The political conditions during the constitutive stages had profound impacts on the strategy of integration. This strategy cannot be fully understood unless we comprehend what the term “crisis” means for integration elites. Jean Monnet viewed crises as opportunities in the context of integration, not as problems. He adopted a strategy to overcome national sovereignty concerns. According to Monnet, the public would never accept new ideas like international integration or federalism, while normal political procedures are at work with no problem. The best time for new ideas was when the current situation revealed serious problems and proven to be unworkable. People would be open to new ideas more especially when they start questioning their main assumptions about the political system (Ball, 1991).

From that viewpoint, crises imply the inadequacy of the current system of nation states, and the necessity of integration. In that sense, if there were no crises, it would not be possible to overcome the sovereignty concerns. Crises are the doors opening to change, and they are the oppor-

tunities that integration movement looks for. At the end, we observe an integration process that develops through crises and inadequacies of the current state system.

By this logic, the crises are not problems but opportunities for people who seek for radical changes. We can interpret crises in the history of the EU from this perspective, including the most recent economic and financial crisis. By that logic, the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal can be interpreted as a product of the incompetent nation-states. Since these crises point to the bad management of national economies, the integration elite has already started discussing necessary steps for further integration. As a result, in December 2012, the EU leaders agreed on establishing a Banking Union for inspecting the banks in the Euro zone countries. This crisis, instead of harming European integration, can elevate it to a new level, where national budgets and fiscal policies are coordinated more closely. This would be a small but important step towards political integration.

The European logic, summarized with above themes, is the approach behind the EU project. This approach took integration process from being sector integration (the Coal and Steel Community) to economic and monetary union. However, the long-term goal of the European federalists is a political union. The passage from economic to political union will be a much harder transformation process. In recent years, integration process seems like slightly stalling. It is possible to observe several indicators of departure or diversion from the legacy of integration that is responsible for the past successes. In order to preserve the peace and prosperity created by the integrative thinking that created the EU, we need to remember and clearly identify the components of the European logic. Now, we can look at the problems that the integration faces today.

THE STATE OF INTEGRATIVE THINKING

The recent developments in Europe imply a break away from the legacy of integration. This can be because of the changing nature of integration, since we witness a much more progressed union. However, the changing attitude and approaches point to a mental shift of much more serious nature. The EU owes much of its success to the European logic, and deviations from it might have dire consequences for the future of integration. There are several clues about the mental shift in integration.

- The first one is about the balance of integration discourse. In the development of integration we can identify two discourses: participation and identity. The balance between these two discourses has significant clues about the nature of integration.
- The second clue about the changing nature of integration concerns the priority-order between the political and economic issues.
- The third group of clues can be derived from the political trends in Europe, especially the rise of nationalist and anti-immigration movements. This is not directly about the working principles of the EU, but it indirectly influences the political culture of the EU.
- The fourth clue concerns the accession of Cyprus. Cyprus is an exemplary case from the perspective of European logic of integrative problem-solving. Our main claim here is that if the EU remained devoted to the European logic, it would not have approached the Cyprus issue the way it had done.

CHANGING BALANCE BETWEEN PARTICIPATION AND IDENTITY DISCOURSES

At the beginning, the general discursive approach to integration focused on participation. Both 1950 Paris Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community and 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community clearly stated that they were open to the participation of other European countries. The enlargement is the main policy outcome of this approach. In this context, despite all cultural differences and political problems, Turkey's application for membership was welcomed.

However, today's keyword to define the main approach in European integration is identity. Creation of a common European identity has become the new focus of integration. Identity creation involves both inclusive and exclusive approaches. But if this process is part of an integration movement, it implies more exclusion. Identity formation implies that the integration is not open to everybody, but to the ones who share a defined identity.

In order to analyze the nature of identity formation, a close examination is needed, because this construction can take different directions. It is difficult to deny that the European logic had a certain vision of an identity creation, and that integration movements need a common identity. However identity formation is more dangerous if it is based on cultural traits

rather than common ideals. An identity of shared ideals rather than that of cultural values can be viewed as benign. However, cultural value-based identities, which take history as a reference point, can be more harmful, because shared ideals emphasize future, while shared culture focus on history. For that reason, common ideals are more in line with the selective remembering and forgetting strategy of the integrative thinking.

The recent trends in Europe point to an identity formation process involving more cultural values (Schlesinger, 1992, pp. 11-23). On the other hand, the European logic, in fact, envisions a European identity based on shared ideals, not cultural values. More appropriate identity formulation for Europe should be based on transnational economic interests plus political values. But today's tendency implies cultural values plus national interests. This can create more confrontational relations with the surrounding regions, and this in turn can create new security issues.

But today, the discussions about an open Europe *vs.* a fortress Europe are reflections of this identity debate. In recent years, the main focus of integration turned away from participation to identity, especially within the context of illegal immigration and relations with Islam. In other words, the discourse of identity has replaced that of participation. In the process of defining European identity, participation is becoming a secondary issue. This, in turn makes EU a relatively more exclusive, rather than inclusive project.

Reprioritized Political Concerns over the Economic Ones

One of the most prominent features of the European logic has been the prioritized economic interests over the political concerns. This helped Europeans to overcome the sovereignty hurdle in the process of integration. As long as the political issues occupy a central position in the agenda, people will be more hesitant to give up on their national sovereignty rights. According to the European logic, if the EU wants to be a federal union, it needs to de-emphasize political issues and avoid any political confrontation with its members. Refocusing on economic issues would be a strategy that is more in line with the European logic. From this point of view, the recent economic crisis might present a great opportunity for this reorientation of the economic mindset.

The recent debates about the future of integration imply that people start once again to view politics above economics. This has significant consequences for integration, because it indicates a divergence from the Euro-

pean logic. These discussions especially focus on identity formation, and national values, instead of participation. In this context, Europe is starting to put more boundaries between herself and outsiders. Rise of nationalist movements is another example of such trends.

THE RISE OF NATIONALIST AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION MOVEMENTS

As the identity discourse and political concerns gain momentum, reflections of this mental shift become more visible. One of the most concrete indicators of this political mood is the rise of nationalist and anti-immigration movements. Political parties representing such movements have increased their potential vote. In 2012 elections, Geert Wilders' Freedom Party in the Netherlands became the third largest party. He is well known for his antagonistic view towards Islam and immigration. In Greece, fascist Golden Dawn received 7 percent of the votes, and for the first time in Greek political history, entered the Greek Parliament with its 21 MPs (Cooper, 2012).

Thilo Sarrazin, a German politician and writer, published a book (*Germany Is Doing Away With Itself*) in 2010, defending restrictions on immigration, expressing his anti-Islamic views proposing that the Muslims are less intelligent. More interestingly, this book, which included racist arguments, sold out in a matter of days after its publication and sold around 1.5 million copies in total. This line of thought also opposes the EU, its monetary union (euro) and the idea of solidarity in Europe (Der Spiegel, 2012).

Rise of nationalist thought has negative reflections on the pluralism and multi-culturalism, which are main components of the European logic. As an example of this negative impact, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, "attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany have utterly failed" (Der Spiegel, 2010). These examples show that the level of commitment to multiculturalism and pluralism plummeted down to dangerous levels in Europe, while nationalism and racism is alarmingly on the rise. This is another clear sign of European logic being forgotten. On the contrary, the legacy of integration propagates peaceful coexistence of different nations despite all their political and cultural differences, because for Europeans, peace and prosperity are viewed as their most precious assets.

The general mood in Europe swung towards anti-immigration and nationalism, and the economic crisis contributed to this trend. Some circles

are questioning even the necessity of further integration. This is partly due to a generational transition (Kupchan, 2010). People who lived through the world wars are either too old or already dead. Those people had learned their lessons from those wars and they were determined to prevent future wars in Europe. They were more willing to make sacrifices for peace. The new generation does not remember those wars outside history books. They complain about the economic difficulties and are more critical of the EU, whereas the older generation was dealing with more urgent problems like war and peace, life and death, hunger and food. The generation of world wars was able to produce positive outcomes out of these problems through the process of integration. Therefore, they know better what the possible alternatives of a failed integration are.

Accession of the Greek Cyprus and the European Logic of Problem Solving 2004 big bang enlargement has changed the EU in irreversible ways. The most striking changes came in the field of geopolitics. Accession of Cyprus as part of the big bang, on the other hand, has deeper consequences for the European legacy of integration, and deserves closer attention. For that reason, an analytical evaluation of the Cyprus case is needed.

European integration movement started as a security-building project in Europe. This project has several strategies, as we have discussed earlier, including a selective remembering and selective forgetting. In that context, it was based on forgetting the inimical experiences between France and Germany. This approach has proven to be effective for the past half century. This is the main reason for Europeans to think that the European experience can be an instructive model for others.

This strategy of forgetting bad experiences is also being followed in the context of the Balkans (Rupnik (ed.), 2011). The EU is now trying to solve the Balkan conflicts and construct a new peace environment in the region through strategic forgetting. This strategy is perfectly in line with the European thinking that is behind all the successes of the EU.

However, the Cyprus case is an outlier in this strategy. The general expectation, in cases like Cyprus, is the EU to bring parties together and pressure them for an acceptable solution for all sides. Such pressures by the EU on conflicting parties have proven to be effective in the past. However, the EU officials did not pressure the Greek Cypriots enough for political solution.

2004 Annan Plan was the greatest of all the missed chances. The Plan

was one last attempt to reach an equitable solution on the island. It proposed a federal solution based on two constituting states with a power-sharing schema. During the referendums, the EU officials pressured the Turkish side to accept the plan, but declared that the Greek side would be accepted as a new member and the sole legitimate representative of the island, no matter what they decided. December 12-13 2002 Copenhagen Summit declared that Cyprus would be “admitted as a new Member State to the European Union. Nevertheless, the European Council confirms its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus” (Presidency Conclusions, POLGEN 84, 2003). What we understand from this declaration is that a united Cyprus was a preference but not a precondition for the EU.

Not surprisingly, while the Turkish side accepted the plan, the Greek side rejected it. In the end, the Greek side was accepted as a member and Turkish side continues to be under international pressure and isolated from the international community. As part of the Annan Plan deal, if the Turkish side had accepted the plan, isolations on the Turkish side would have ended. But since the 2004 referendum, these isolations still continue. No international flights allowed to the Turkish side, it is excluded from the European funds, such as the Erasmus exchange program, and its teams are not allowed in the international competitions. On the other hand, the international community recognizes the Greek part as the sole legitimate government of the whole island. This discriminate recognition does not contribute to the solution, but exacerbates the problem. Perhaps, this is the only example where the European integration has, instead of contributing to the solution of a regional problem, aggravated it (Tocci, 2002, pp. 104-138).

In its decision about Cyprus, the EU acted not as a security provider in the region. It turned into a party to the problem, rather than a problem solver. In this case, the EU rewarded the intransigent party, while punishing the amenable Turkish side. For that reason, accession of Cyprus, before a political solution, does not match the European thinking. The Greek Cypriots did not show any effort towards solution, but still rewarded with membership. The EU did not use its soft power to force Greek Cypriots to accept the Annan Plan. Therefore, neither did the EU show any effort for its integrative lessons to create positive outcomes in Cyprus. Thus, while the solution was so simple and easy before 2004, it is equally impossible now.

The EU, by the logic of integration, is committed to destroy all divisions in Europe. The European logic requires all boundaries and divisions between people to be wiped out by the links of institutional cooperation. However, the Cyprus policy is an outlier in that respect as well, because it deepened the divisions, instead of obliterating them. This approach, contradicts the European logic not only in the Cyprus context, but also with regards to relations with Turkey. For that reason, the choices made in Cyprus might have serious consequences for the integrative thinking.

Could it be any different, if had the EU followed a different path on Cyprus problem? Probably yes. If the EU had demanded the Greek party to accept the plan as a precondition for membership, most probably the problem could have been solved by now.

THE TURKISH CASE

In the following years, the most serious test of the European logic will be the relations with Turkey. Turkey has deep cultural differences from the other countries in the EU and its society has a different religion. However, Turkey shares the democratic values and ideals of the European project. If the European project were based on cultural and religious values, Turkey would have no place in it. But if it is going to be built on shared ideals and political values, there is no reason to exclude Turkey (Giannakopoulos, 2004 pp. 59-72).

Such an inclusive project has to be based on pluralism and accept religious and cultural differences on the bases of shared ideals. In that project, religious differences are tolerable, and the past is not an obstacle for future associations. Conflicts of the past need to be forgotten, and shared ideals need to be emphasized for the sake of future aspirations. Just like the European logic prophesizes, this project has to be about future, not the past.

The European logic requires such an approach. But a closer look at the debates in recent years, we detect serious deviations from and contradictions with this logic. For example, despite the absence of any discussion about Turkey not being belonged to Europe during the Cold War, Turkey's European identity is being questioned in the 2000s. There is no doubt that such discussions are based on religious differences, not on geography, culture, or political ideals.

Even though some put forward geographical arguments, these are not convincing, because Turkey's geography has not changed since her mem-

bership application in 1987. Then, no geographical concerns were raised about that application. Interestingly, Morocco applied also in 1987 for the membership in the European Economic Community, which was rejected on geographical grounds.

This means that the innocent and reasonable looking geographical arguments against the Turkish membership have deeper meanings and might have serious consequences for integration. When we talk about Turkey being European, we talk about a Europe of differences and of pluralism. But when we claim that Turkey does not belong to Europe, we are talking about a different kind of Europe, which is more religious, more conservative and more historical. However, the European logic is about creating a new Europe, uniting old enemies and forgetting past conflicts. It is a vision about the future, not the past.

For that reason, despite all the divergences from the European logic, its true test of integrity in the following years will be the relations with Turkey. Rejection of Turkey on the grounds of cultural and religious differences and historical references of such arguments contradict the European legacy and project of integration.

CONCLUSION

Europe is going through hard times both economically and politically. The economic crisis is challenging the futuristic vision of the European logic. Most of the problems that Europe is facing today are partly because of the divergences from the European legacy that established it in the years that followed the World War. In the beginning, integration elites adopted a strategy based on strict, scrutinized and meticulous planning and careful timing. Political and cultural differences and past experiences were put aside in order to build a common and a more peaceful future.

However, in recent years we witness more emphasis on cultural and political differences, prominence of historical and religious concerns. The Euro area sovereign debt crisis also showed us that the decisions about the monetary union were made carelessly, in full contradiction with the scrupulous planning and vigilant timing of the founding fathers. The inspection procedures about the conditions of monetary union (the growth and stability pact), especially about the budgetary deficit and sovereign debt, were not followed. At the end, we have a serious economic crisis, threatening whole Europe.

Economic consequences are one example of deviation from the European logic. More serious costs might occur in the political field, especially resulting from xenophobia. For integration to continue its progress, Europeans need to remember their legacy of integration, how they achieved peace, stability and prosperity in the region, and stick to this integrative logic to preserve their accomplishments.

REFERENCES

- Angell, N. (2007) *The Great Illusion*, New York: Cosimo Classics.
- Bachoff, T. (1999) *The German Problem Transformed. Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995*, University of Michigan.
- Ball, G. W. (1991) "Introduction", Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds.), *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bauman, Z. (1997). *Post modernity and Its Discontents*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Chase, J.L. (1952) "The Development of the Morgenthau Plan Through the Quebec Conference," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 16, No: 2 pp. 324-359.
- Cooper, R. (2012) "Rise of the Greek neo-Nazis: Ultra-right Party Golden Dawn Wants to Force Immigrants into Work Camps and Plant Landmines Along Turkish Border," *Daily Mail*, 7 May 2012, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2140686/Greek-elections-2012-Neo-Nazi-party-Golden-Dawn-want-force-immigrants-work-camps.html#ixzz2Hko9aChv>
- Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions, POLGEN 84, 15917/02, Brussels, 29 January 2003, p. 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf
- Coppieters, B., Huysseune, M., Emerson, M., Tocci N., Vahl, M. (2003). *European Institutional Models as Instruments of Conflict Resolution In the Divided States of the European Periphery. CEPS Working Document*, No 195.
- Coppieters, B., Emerson M., Huysseune M., et. al, (2004) *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution, Case Studies from the European Periphery*, Gent: Academia Press.
- Diez, T., Stetter, S., Albert, M., (2006) *The European Union and Border*

- Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration*. International Organization, Vol. 60, No 3 (July 2006), pp. 563-593.
- Giannakopoulos, A. (2004). *What is to Become of Turkey in Europe? European Identity and Turkey's EU Accession*, Perceptions, pp. 59-72.
- Jenkins, R. (1977). *Europe's Present Challenge and Future Opportunity*", *President of the Commission of the European Communities*, Florence, 27 October 1977, <http://aei.pitt.edu/4404/1/4404.pdf>
- Kagan, R. (2003). *Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books.
- Kupchan, Ch. (2010). As Nationalism Rises, Will the European Union Fall?. *The Washington Post*, 29 August. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR2010082702138.html>
- Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol .40 No 2, pp. 235-258.
- Michalski, A. (2005). The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," in J. Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy. The New Soft Power in International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 124-144.
- Özdemir, H. (2012). *Avrupa Mantığı. Avrupa Bütünleşmesinin Teori ve Dinamikleri*, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.
- Rupnik, J.(ed.) (2011). *The Western Balkans and the EU: "The Hour of Europe" Chailot Papers*, 126, European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Sarrazin Strikes Again, German Author Says Berlin Is Hostage to Holocaust in Euro Crisis*. *Der Spiegel International Online*, 22 May 2012, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/controversial-german-author-thilo-sarrazin-launches-book-on-euro-crisis-a-834459.html>
- Schlesinger, P. (1992) *Europeanness' – A New Cultural Battleground?*. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Vol. 5, No 2, pp. 11-23.
- Spinelli, A., Rossi E. (2003). *Ventotene Manifesto*, B. F. Nelsen, A. Stubb (ed.), *The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of the European Integration*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, s. 3-6.
- Tocci, N. (2002). *Cyprus and the European Union Accession Process: Inspiration for Peace or Incentive for Crisis?*. *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3 No 2, pp. 104-138.
- Waeber, O. (1995). *Identity, Integration, and Security. Solving the Sovere-*

ignity Puzzle in the EU Studies,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 389-431.

The World from Berlin: Merkel’s Rhetoric in Integration Debate is ‘Inexcusable’ *Der Spiegel International Online*, 18 October 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkel-s-rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html>

