



ANNA WIERZCHOWSKA

Vizja University, Warsaw, Poland

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4340-9418

ANETA NOWAKOWSKA-KRYSTMAN

Vizja University, Warsaw, Poland

ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7247-3243

TOMASZ KOWNACKI

Vizja University, Warsaw, Poland

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0853-0108

TOMASZ WIERZCHOWSKI

Vizja University, Warsaw, Poland

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3986-8187

PIOTR DANILUK

General Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military
University of Land Forces, Poland

ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5639-0162

BUILDING STATE RESILIENCE IN THE SOCIAL DIMENSION. ANALYSIS WITH REFERENCE TO SECURITY POLICY IN POLAND

**BUDOWANIE ODPORNOŚCI W WYMIARZE
SPOŁECZNYM. ANALIZA W ODNIESIENIU DO
POLITYKI BEZPIECZEŃSTWA W POLSCE**

ABSTRACT

Objective: *This article examines the concept of building state resilience through a social lens, with a particular focus on the roles of communities and institutions in crisis management. It analyzes how contemporary approaches to public security incorporate society's capacity for adaptation, recovery, and cooperation during crises. The primary goal is to identify key factors that support the development of social resilience, especially in the context of Poland's security policy.*

Methods: *The study employs qualitative methods and content analysis, integrating theoretical and practical perspectives from crisis management and resilience theory. It draws on conceptual comparisons between social capital theory, constructivism, resilience theory, and crisis management theory. In addition, strategic documents and legal acts related to Poland's crisis management system were analyzed to evaluate the extent to which resilience-based approaches have been implemented.*

Results: *The findings indicate that social resilience depends on both institutional strategies and civic engagement. A key factor is the integration of grassroots initiatives into the crisis management system and support for citizen involvement in emergency planning and response. Civic education plays a vital role in enhancing public awareness and preparedness. In Poland, persistent challenges include low levels of trust in public institutions and insufficient coordination between civil society and formal security structures.*

Discussion: *Social resilience cannot be built solely through top-down policies – it requires active participation from local communities and NGOs. Effective crisis management must combine hierarchical governance with bottom-up initiatives. Strengthening public trust through dialogue and institutional transparency is essential. The development of resilience also calls for long-term investment in civic education and social capital, which enhance the state's capacity to manage contemporary threats. Flexible crisis management strategies must reflect local conditions and leverage community potential.*

KEYWORDS: *crisis management, state security, Polish society, security policy, state resilience*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, **resilience** has emerged as a central concept in public security policy. In its social dimension, it refers not only to the capacity of institutions to respond to crises, but also to the ability of societies to self-organize, adapt, and maintain critical functions under pressure. Particularly in democratic systems, resilience is not imposed from above – it is co-created through public trust, civic engagement, and transparent governance (Boin et al., 2010; Joseph, 2013).

In Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, the relevance of resilience has grown in response to **geopolitical tensions, energy insecurity, cyber threats, and mass displacement**. These challenges require more than technical preparedness; they demand **whole-of-society approaches** that combine state capabilities with active civic participation (Sadowska, 2014; Górska-Rożej, 2022).

This article explores how Poland develops social resilience in the face of **hybrid threats and systemic disruptions**. It examines how legal frameworks, civic education, digital engagement platforms, and community-based actions interact to support democratic stability and public security.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The study is built on three interconnected concepts: security, crisis management, and resilience. Their analytical application demonstrates how they complement each other in shaping effective threat response and adaptive security systems.

The research employs qualitative methods, including document content analysis, comparative analysis, and interdisciplinary approaches rooted in political science and sociology. It draws from resilience theory, crisis management theory, constructivism, and social capital theory.

Security and development are key to stable governance (Trzciński, 2015; Tschirgi, Lund, Mancini, 2010). Security policy is articulated in national strategies but operates at supranational, national, and local levels (Szydłowski, 2024; Pawłowski, 2017; Jarmoszko, 2025). In democracies, this becomes a permanent component of the system (Gryz, 2017; Kitler, 2023).

Security, as a core need (Maslow, 1943; Sadowska, 2014), is institutionalized by the state through risk assessment and strategic planning (*National Crisis Management Plan*). It has both subjective dimensions – shaped by public sentiment, media, and communication (Krzeszowski, 2019) – and objective ones, reflected in measurable indicators and crisis management documents (Pawłowski, 2015; Webb, Wills-Herrera, 2012), which together influence policy and behavior.

CRISIS AND RESILIENCE

The need for security grows with the intensity of experienced threats and crises. A crisis is a disruption of social, economic, or political structures caused by sudden events, and can be analyzed from various perspectives (Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, Coombs, 2017).

Crisis management theory addresses how to plan, organize, and control responses to such emergencies, aiming to minimize losses and quickly restore balance (Pauchant, Mitroff, Lagadec, 1991). It includes four stages: preparation, response, recovery, and evaluation (Bieńkowska-Kral, Zabłocka-Kluczka, 2023; Mitroff, 2005). The latter two stages are especially relevant to resilience thinking, focusing on strengthening systems to prevent or mitigate future crises.

RESILIENCE AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONCEPT

Resilience is a cross-disciplinary concept. In social sciences, it refers to the capacity of social systems to maintain balance during crises, adapt to changing conditions, and recover. It is both a process of learning and adaptation and a system's ability to tolerate shocks and reorganize when needed (Joseph, 2013, 39).

Resilience implies governance structures and human resources capable of responding effectively under stress (Boin et al., 2010). It can be viewed both as a process (Pelling, 2003) and an outcome (Manyena, 2006; McEntire et al., 2002). Socially resilient systems are marked by institutional capacity, scenario readiness, shock absorption, and a balance between resilience and efficiency (de Weijer, 2013).

Linking resilience with security is justified, as stable conditions and reduced disruption risks are fundamental to security. A resilient state takes effective action across sectors, emphasizing adaptability and ongoing improvement (Hollnagel, 2011; Fluri, Tagarev, 2020). This perspective, unlike classical approaches, recognizes that threats are inevitable, but response and recovery capacities can be strengthened (Cavelty, Kaufmann, Søby, 2015).

SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN RESILIENCE

Constructivist and social capital theories highlight the social foundations of security, emphasizing how cultural, historical, and discursive factors shape threat perceptions and responses. Constructivism shifts attention from objective risks to socially constructed meanings, underscoring the roles of norms, identity, and values. Identity, as both a product of interaction and a basis for solidarity, influences how societies define and respond to threats (Skolimowska, 2019, 113; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).

This perspective explains that resilience stems from civic identity, discourse, and social capital (Piątkowski, 2017; Putnam, 2000). Public narratives determine threat perception, agency, and trust; inclusive identities foster resilience, while rigid or manipulated ones may weaken it (Schininà, Papadopoulos, Saul, 2021; NASK, 2025; Skrendo, 2004; Oleszkowicz & Gwiżdż, 2019; Bielska, 2013). Resilience is thus shaped not only institutionally, but also through social interactions and collective narratives (Castells, 2010).

Social capital theory reinforces this view, stressing trust, cooperation, and social networks as key to effective crisis response (Psyk-Piotrowska et al., 2013; Coleman, 1988). It provides a framework to assess how social cohesion enhances institutional capacity. Together, these theories highlight the essential role of social factors in building resilience within security policy.

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF SECURITY POLICY – AREAS OF DEPENDENCY AND ACTION

The relationship between security policy, crisis, and resilience is multidimensional, reflected in public trust, civic engagement, education on crisis behavior, and the alignment of legal frameworks with social expectations (Pokruszyński, 2010). These factors are essential for effective crisis response – neglecting them weakens the state and increases vulnerability (Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek, 2024).

Resilience relies heavily on social resources. Trust in institutions enhances coordination, reduces panic, and supports effective communication (Kolczyńska, 2015; OECD, 2017; UNDP, 2021; Fukuyama, 1995; European Social Survey, 2015). High-trust societies, like those in Scandinavia, showed greater cohesion during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, unlike low-trust contexts like the U.S. (Devine, Gaskell et al., 2021).

Education builds preparedness and adaptability – knowledge in areas such as first aid, cybersecurity, and crisis protocols improves societal resilience (Wojakowska, 2020; Grabowska-Lepczak, 2022; Prus, Rewak, 2024; Okoń-Horodyńska, 2024; Kurtenbach, 2023; Bachmann, Mosquera, 2017; Richardson, 2021). Civic engagement, including volunteering and NGO activity, reinforces early warning, cooperation with authorities, and social cohesion (Stark, Taylor, 2014; Górska-Rożej, 2022; Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek, 2020). Poland's grassroots support for Ukrainian refugees exemplifies this potential.

Institutional and legal adaptation ensures effective responses through coordinated mechanisms and long-term planning (Walczak, 2020; Crisis Management Act, 2007). Examples include FEMA, the Government Security Center, and EU civil protection networks. Enhancing personnel skills and digital capacity is critical (Territorial Defense Forces, 2025; FEMA; CDC, 2018). Legal systems must address both crisis scenarios and everyday resilience-building, while avoiding excessive rigidity and citizen disengagement (Golinowski, 2013; Moszczyński, Bryczek-Wróbel, 2022; Boin, Comfort & Demchak, 2010; Norris, Stevens et al., 2008).

Table 1. *Social factors in the security dimension*

Social Trust and Security Policy & Resilience	Education as the Foundation of Resilience and Security	Civic Engagement and Crisis Management	Institutional and Legal Adaptation and Systemic Resilience
High public trust in state institutions, security services, and decision-making bodies increases the effectiveness of security policy.	The education system prepares society for crisis response by developing analytical skills, critical thinking, and awareness of threats.	An active civil society can support the state in crisis actions, e.g., through volunteer organizations, self-help, or local initiatives.	Effective institutions and flexible laws enable rapid crisis response and adaptation to new threats.
During crises (e.g., pandemics, terrorist attacks), societies with strong social capital better follow government guidelines, reinforcing social resilience.	Civic education fosters responsibility and readiness to act in crises.	Low engagement limits the state's capacity for social mobilization during crises.	Bureaucratic and inefficient structures weaken security policy and slow down crisis responses.
Lack of trust may lead to misinformation, chaos, and resistance to security efforts, worsening the crisis.	Lack of education increases vulnerability to manipulation, misinformation, and panic during crises.	Societies with active civic sectors return to normalcy more quickly after crises.	Democratic legal systems must balance security with civil liberties to maintain public trust.

Source: Own elaboration

Institutional and legal adaptation ensures effective responses through coordinated mechanisms and long-term planning (Walczak, 2020; Crisis Management Act, 2007). Examples include FEMA, the Government Security Center, and EU civil protection networks. Enhancing personnel skills and digital capacity is critical (Territorial Defense Forces, 2025; FEMA; CDC, 2018). Legal systems must address both crisis scenarios and everyday resilience-building, while avoiding excessive rigidity and citizen disengagement (Golinowski, 2013; Moszczyński, Bryczek-Wróbel, 2022; Boin, Comfort & Demchak, 2010; Norris, Stevens et al., 2008).

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF BUILDING SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN SECURITY POLICY – ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ACTIONS AND CHALLENGES IN POLAND

Building social resilience requires multi-level efforts – from central government to local initiatives and the private sector. In response to growing risks like natural disasters, cyber threats, pandemics, and geopolitical instability, Poland has taken steps to enhance resilience (Quental, Lourenço & Nunes da Silva, 2011; Walker, Holling et al., 2004).

Resilience is defined here as the ability of systems to absorb disruptions and reorganize while maintaining core functions and structures, whereas vulnerability reflects the risks of small changes causing major social impacts (Folke, 2006). Achieving resilience requires joint action by authorities and citizens.

The state contributes through strategic documents and policies that assign roles to institutions and social actors (Wojakowska, 2020; Putnam, 1995). Citizens support resilience through integration, rapid response, education, and cooperation – including in public-private partnerships. All stakeholders must continually strengthen their competencies to counter risks such as cyberattacks and disinformation.

STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS SHAPING SECURITY POLICY

Social resilience is anchored in systemic solutions found in core national security documents. The National Security Strategy of Poland (2020) identifies resilience as a strategic priority, highlighting the need for a comprehensive system drawing on human, organizational, material, and soft power resources (Jagnieża, 2020; Zespół Strategicznego Przeglądu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2024).

Section 4.1.2 (Pillar 1) defines social resilience through goals such as adapting security education, fostering patriotism and civic responsibility, developing voluntary rescue services, and promoting legal reforms that support civic participation.

The Crisis Management Act (2007) establishes a coordinated, multi-level response system to large-scale threats, supported by the National Crisis Management Plan and critical infrastructure protection – key for maintaining public trust and systemic stability.

The Civil Protection and Civil Defense Act (2024) addresses both natural and military threats (notably from Russia), underlining the citizen's role in self-protection and assigning local authorities the duty of supporting communities during the initial crisis phase (Resilience Congress, 2024).

SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN RESILIENCE-BUILDING PROCESSES

Legal and institutional frameworks are not enough – social resilience also depends on shared goals, societal cohesion, and cooperation among citizens, authorities, and civil society. Trust in institutions, mutual support, and a sense of community drive active involvement in prevention and recovery efforts.

Polish society has repeatedly shown an ability to mobilize during crises (Makowski, 2024), from humanitarian missions to grassroots charity initiatives. Yet such responses are often short-lived. Lasting resilience requires sustained civic engagement, including in times of peace.

Key strategies include organizing local safety efforts, implementing crisis education programs, and building public–private partnerships in emergency response.

ORGANIZING LOCAL SAFETY INITIATIVES

Strengthening social integration through shared initiatives fosters cooperation, develops crisis-relevant skills, and builds local capacity. Volunteer projects – such as those by NGOs and the Volunteer Fire Service (OSP) – play a vital role in prevention and emergency response (Bubak, 2018; Lenartowicz, 2024). During COVID-19, grassroots groups supported vulnerable populations with aid like food deliveries.

Polish society's spontaneous mobilization after Russia's invasion of Ukraine was internationally recognized. Local actors were quickest to act – offering shelter, food, and psychological support (CBOS, 2022; UNHCR, 2023; Deloitte, 2022; Klon/Jawor, 2023). Over 70% of Poles participated in aid efforts, donating over 10 billion PLN (CBOS, 2022; Deloitte, 2022). Large organizations such as Caritas and PAH provided wide-reaching assistance (Caritas Polska, 2023; PAH, 2023). International bodies highlighted Poland's civic and institutional roles, noting enhanced trust and resilience (UNHCR, 2023; UNICEF ECAR, 2023; NBP, 2023; OECD, 2023).

DEVELOPING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS AND TRAINING ON SECURITY

Education is vital to building long-term resilience, though its impact is not always immediate (Lorek, 2017). Still, effective crisis management depends on citizens equipped with essential skills (Pieczywok, 2011). Initiatives may include school-based safety education, adult crisis-response training, and programs promoting social responsibility (Prus, Rewak, 2024; Territorial Defense Forces, 2025).

The **Territorial Defense Forces (WOT)** exemplify a model combining civilian life with national defense training (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej, 2025). Increasing focus is also placed on cybersecurity education, especially for seniors, to counter disinformation and prevent cybercrime (Rogalewicz, 2022; Report on the State of Cybersecurity in Poland, 2021). Digital and self-defense skills are now key components of societal resilience

BUILDING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In democratic societies, security requires collaboration between the public and private sectors. Public-private partnerships support this goal by protecting critical infrastructure, funding resilience initiatives, and engaging the media in risk education (Brocki, 2019; Trubalska, 2015; World Economic Forum, 2016).

Businesses may also assist in humanitarian logistics or crisis recovery. Such cooperation fosters civic responsibility, strengthens trust, and enhances society's collective ability to withstand and recover from crises

CHALLENGES RELATED TO DISINFORMATION AND CYBERSECURITY

Cybersecurity is a crucial component of protecting critical infrastructure and digital services (Papastergiou, Mouratidis, et al., 2020). A key regulatory framework in this area is the NIS2 Directive, which applies to operators of essential services – such as energy, transport, banking, and digital infrastructure – as well as to digital service providers like e-commerce platforms and cloud services (Directive (EU) 2022/255; Drivas, Chatzopoulou, et al., 2020).

The directive aims to enhance the security of networks and information systems by imposing stricter risk management and data protection requirements, thereby strengthening resilience to cyber threats and fostering cooperation among regulated entities (Negreiro, 2023). However, legal measures alone are not sufficient – true societal resilience also relies on citizens' digital awareness, which must be developed through comprehensive education at all levels.

STATISTICAL DATA

To illustrate how local initiatives, education, and public–private partnerships enhance social resilience, selected empirical cases from Poland were analyzed. The findings confirm the existence of a societal–institutional model of resilience, integrating state institutions, local communities, the private sector, and citizens across five dimensions: communicative, operational, competence-based, technological, and defensive.

A notable example of civic engagement is the National Safety Threat Map (Krajowa Mapa Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa, KMZB), managed by the Police, which allows citizens to report local threats (Policja, 2024). By 2022, nearly 2.5 million reports had been submitted, of which 51% were verified – leading to

the elimination of over 1.1 million identified threats (Portal mundurowy, 2024). In 2023, the platform averaged 17.8 reports per 10,000 people, with highest activity in counties such as Bolesławiec and Bydgoszcz (Polish Police, 2024). KMZB thus fulfills both operational and educational functions, promoting public trust and engagement.

The Volunteer Fire Brigades (OSP) and the National Firefighting and Rescue System (KSRG) form the operational backbone of local resilience. With over 5,000 units and 700,000 members, these organizations integrate civic and institutional capacities for rapid crisis response, while also reinforcing social cohesion and trust in public services (GUS, 2024; KSRG, 2023).

Educational and training programs, led by the State Fire Service and the Government Security Centre, focus on communication, foresight, and interagency coordination. In 2025 alone, 148 public officials took part in dedicated resilience training (Government Security Centre, 2025; State Fire Service, 2025), indicating growing institutional commitment to preparedness and capacity-building.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) play a crucial role in the technological layer of resilience. Initiatives such as CyberSecure Poland and Cyber-Resilient Local Government reflect cooperation in digital risk management (CPPC, 2025), while the Alert RCB system, reaching over 80% of the population, improves early warning and public communication infrastructure (RCB, 2024).

Finally, Civic Defence Mobilisation demonstrates the expanding role of society in national security. The Territorial Defence Forces (WOT), with 36,000 volunteers, link military preparedness with local engagement and education (Ministry of National Defence, 2024). A 40% increase in self-defence training, alongside the development of civic cyber initiatives such as Cyber Volunteers of Poland and CISO4U, underscores the evolution of resilience into the digital and ethical spheres (Authors' own elaboration, 2024).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Modern states face numerous security challenges, including both traditional threats – such as armed conflicts, natural disasters, and economic crises – and new types of threats, like cyberattacks, disinformation, pandemics, and challenges related to sustainable development. In response to these evolving threats, social resilience plays a crucial role in ensuring national stability and security.

The presented data confirm that societal activity in Poland plays a substantial and measurable role in strengthening state resilience within the framework of security policy. This is not a symbolic form of engagement but a structurally integrated system linking citizens, institutions, and technological networks in a shared commitment to safety. All presented layers form a comprehensive architecture of societal resilience that transforms security from a state monopoly into a co-creation process rooted in collaboration and shared accountability. Poland's approach reflects a broader European tendency to integrate citizens and institutions in resilience-building. Security, in this context, is no longer solely the capacity to protect but the ability to anticipate, adapt, and act collectively in defence of shared democratic values and public safety.

Security policies aimed at building resilient societies should focus on effective crisis management systems, critical infrastructure protection, and civil defense mechanisms that support, rather than replace, individual citizen responsibility. Accordingly, these efforts must go beyond traditional military, legal, or diplomatic tools and extend into education and training systems. Through this, it becomes possible to reshape public awareness and even redefine national identity in terms of how security is perceived and enacted.

Poland's historical legacy has fostered a reactive approach to crises. However, building social responsibility, anticipatory thinking, and a proactive stance toward threats can transform this legacy. The responsibility for creating such a system lies in promoting civic duty, patriotic values, and transparent communication of current and future threats.

REFERENCES

- Bachmann, S. D., & Mosquera, A. (2017). *The concept of resilience: Security implications and implementation challenges*. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 12(1), 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2017.14150>
- Bielska, E. (2013). *Koncepcje oporu we współczesnych naukach społecznych. Główne problemy, pojęcia, rozstrzygnięcia*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. https://sbc.org.pl/Content/372666/PDF/koncepcje_oporu_we_wspolczesnych_naukach.pdf
- Bieńkowska-Kral, Z., & Zabłocka-Kluczka, A. (2005). *Istota i ewolucja zarządzania kryzysowego*. *Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu*, (1092), 25–32. <https://dbc.wroc.pl/dlibra/publication/168555/edition/129969/content>
- Boin, A., Comfort, L. K., & Demchak, C. C. (Eds.). (2010). *Designing resilience: Preparing for extreme events*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5hj0c>
- Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). *Beyond identity*. *Theory and Society*, 29(1), 1–47. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007068714468>
- Bubak, M. (2018). *Rola Ochotniczych Straży Pożarnych w budowaniu bezpieczeństwa lokalnego*. *Studia de Securitate*, 8, 75–90. <https://studiadesecuritate.uken.krakow.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/12/6.pdf>
- Bundy, J., Pfarrer, M. D., Short, C. E., & Coombs, W. T. (2017). *Crises and crisis management: Integration, interpretation, and research development*. *Journal of Management*, 43(6), 1661–1692. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206316680030>
- Caritas Polska. (2023). *Raport 2023*. <https://caritas.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/raport-caritas-pl-2023.pdf>
- Castells, M. (2010). *The power of identity* (2nd ed.). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Cavelty, M., Kaufmann, M., & Soby Kristensen, K. (2015). *Resilience and (in) security: Practices, subjects, temporalities*. *Security Dialogue*, 46(1), 3–14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614559637>
- CBOS. (2022). *Polacy wobec uchodźców z Ukrainy*. https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_062_22.PDF
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2018). *Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC)*. <https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/>
- Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS). (2024). *Statistical yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2024*. <https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/statistical-yearbooks/statistical-yearbooks/statistical-yearbook-of-the-republic-of-poland-2024,2,26.html>
- Centrum Projektów Polska Cyfrowa. (2025). *Cyberbezpieczny samorząd*. <https://www.gov.pl/web/cppc/cyberbezpieczny-samorzad>
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). *Social capital in the creation of human capital*. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95–120.

- de Weijer, F. (2013). *Resilience: A Trojan horse for a new way of thinking?* (Discussion Paper No. 139). European Centre for Development Policy Management. <https://ecdpm.org/dp139>
- Deloitte. (2022). *Support for Ukraine*. <https://www.deloitte.com/an/en/about/governance/global-impact-report/support-for-ukraine.html>
- Devine, D., Gaskell, J., Jennings, W., & Stoker, G. (2021). *Trust and the coronavirus pandemic: What are the consequences of and for trust? An early review of the literature*. *Political Studies Review*, 19(2), 274–285. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920948684>
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 concerning measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2). <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555>
- Drivas, G., Chatzopoulou, A., Maglaras, L., Lambrinoudakis, C., Cook, A., & Janicke, H. (2020). *A NIS directive compliant cybersecurity maturity assessment framework*. arXiv:2004.10411. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.10411>
- Emergency Management Institute. (2024). *About EMI: Mission and programs*. FEMA. <https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx>
- European Social Survey. (2015). *Trust in institutions and democracy (ESS Topline Results Series Issue 6)*. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/ESS7_toplines_issue_6_trust_in_institutions.pdf
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2024). *FEMA training and education*. <https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/training>
- Fluri, P., & Tagarev, T. (2020). *The concept of resilience: Security implications and implementation challenges*. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 19(3), 5–12. <https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.19.3.00>
- Folke, C. (2006). *Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses*. *Global Environmental Change*, 16(3), 253–267. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.04.002>
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Golinowski, J. (2013). *Przesłanki biurokratyzacji zarządzania. Model teoretyczny*. W: J. Golinowski (red.), *Zarządzanie publiczne* (s. 9–24). Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego.
- Górska-Rożej, K. (2022). *Partycypacja obywatelska jako element procesu kształtowania odporności na zagrożenia w społecznościach na poziomie lokalnym*. *Management and Quality – Zarządzanie i Jakość*, 4(4).
- Grabowska-Lepczak, I. (2022). *Współczesny wymiar edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa w Polsce*. *Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP*, 81, 167–178. <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0015.8130>
- Gryz, J., Nowakowska-Krystman, A., & Boguszewski, Ł. (2017). *Kluczowe kompetencje systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*. Warszawa: Difin.
- Hollnagel, E. (2011). *Resilience engineering in practice: A guidebook*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. <https://doi.org/10.1201/9781317065265>

- Jagnieża, A. (2020). *Budowa odporności państwa jako nakaz strategiczny*. Defence24. <https://defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/budowa-odpornosci-panstwa-jako-nakaz-strategiczny-opinia>
- Jarmoszko, S. (2016). *Teoretyczne konceptualizacje i sensy bezpieczeństwa w naukach społecznych*. W: S. Jarmoszko, C. Kalita, & J. Maciejewski (red.), *Nauki społeczne wobec problemu bezpieczeństwa* (s. 25–82). Siedlce: Uniwersytet w Siedlcach.
- Joseph, J. (2013). *Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: A governmentality approach*. *Resilience*, 1(1), 38–52. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2013.765741>
- Kitler, W. (2023). *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne w świetle współczesnych wyzwań teorii i praktyki problemu*. *Wiedza Obronna*, 282(1).
- Klon/Jawor Association. (2023). *Organizacje pozarządowe wobec wojny w Ukrainie*. Warszawa. <https://fakty.ngo.pl>
- Kolczyńska, M. (2015). *Zaufanie do instytucji państwowych*. W: POLPAN 1988–2013. Warszawa: IFiS PAN. https://www.polpan.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/POLPAN_raport_Zaufanie.pdf
- Kongres Odporność. (2024). *Samorządy nie są gotowe do obrony ludności cywilnej*. Serwis Samorządowy PAP. <https://samorząd.pap.pl>
- Krzeszowski, W. (2019). *Subjective safety threats in crisis management*. W: *Crisis management and crisis situation solutions*. Zlín: UTB.
- Kurtenbach, S. (2023). *Ukraine's education policy as a pillar for societal resilience and successful rebuilding*. Bonn: German Development Institute. <https://feps-europe.eu>
- Lenartowicz, M. (2024). *Nowa ustawa – nowe wyzwania*. *Przegląd Pożarniczy*. <https://www.ppoz.pl>
- Lorek, M. (2017). *Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa jako ogniwo w systemie bezpieczeństwa*. *Edukacja – Technika – Informatyka*, 4(22).
- Makowski, J. (2024). *W czasach kryzysu naszą największą bronią jest solidarność*. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. <https://wyborcza.pl>
- Manyena, S. B. (2006). *The concept of resilience revisited*. *Disasters*, 30(4), 433–450. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2006.00331.x>
- Maslow, A. H. (1943). *A theory of human motivation*. *Psychological Review*, 50(4), 370–396. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346>
- McEntire, D. A., Fuller, C., Johnson, C. W., & Weber, R. (2002). *A comparison of disaster paradigms: The search for a holistic policy guide*. *Public Administration Review*, 62(2), 267–281.
- Okoń-Horodyńska, E. (2024). *Kryzys i innowacje. Co jest grane? Optimum*. *Economic Studies*, 1(115), 45–67. <https://doi.org/10.15290/oes.2024.01.115.03>
- Oleszkowicz, A., & Gwiżdż, K. (2019). *Formowanie się tożsamości osobistej w okresie stającej się dorosłości, w kontekście poczucia bezpieczeństwa i gotowości do zmian*. *Polskie Forum Psychologiczne*, 24(2), 184–204. https://pfp.ukw.edu.pl/page/pl/archive/article/422/oleszkowicz_gwizdz_formowanie_sie_tozsamosci_osobistej/article.pdf

- Papastergiou, S., Mouratidis, H., & Kalogeraki, E. M. (2019). *Cyber security incident handling, warning and response system for the European critical information infrastructures (CyberSANE)*. W: J. Macintyre, L. Iliadis, I. Maglogiannis, & C. Jayne (red.), *Engineering applications of neural networks* (s. 430–441). Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20257-6_41
- Pauchant, T. C., Mitroff, I. I., & Lagadec, P. (1991). *Toward a systemic crisis management strategy: Learning from the best examples in the US, Canada and France*. *Industrial Crisis Quarterly*, 5, 209–232.
- Pawłowski, J. (2015). *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa współczesnego państwa (podmiotu)*. Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
- Pelling, M. (2003). *The vulnerability of cities: Social resilience and natural disaster*. London: Earthscan.
- Piątkowski, W. (2017). *Tożsamość zbiorowa w kontekście bezpieczeństwa państwa. Przegląd Strategiczny*, 2, 41–55.
- Pieczywok, A. (2011). *Wybrane problemy z zakresu edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa*. Warszawa: Akademia Obrony Narodowej.
- Pokruszyński, W. (2010). *Teoretyczne aspekty bezpieczeństwa*. Józefów: Wydawnictwo WSGE. <https://www.wydawnictwo.wsge.edu.pl/pdf-134397-62648>
- Policja. (2024). *Dane statystyczne dotyczące liczby zgłoszeń w Krajowej Mapie Zagrożeń Bezpieczeństwa w latach 2021–2023*. Komenda Główna Policji. <https://mapy.geoportal.gov.pl/iMapLite/KMZBPublic.html>
- Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH). (2023). *Ukraine emergency response: Annual report 2022–2023*. Warszawa: PAH. <https://www.pah.org.pl/gdzie-dzialamy/ukraina/>
- Portal mundurowy. (2024, May 31). *Krajowa mapa zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa – zadbajmy sami o nasze bezpieczeństwo*. <https://portal-mundurowy.pl/index.php/aktualnosci/temat-krajowa-mapa-zagrozen-bezpieczenstwa-zadbajmy-sami-o-nasze-bezpieczenstwo>
- Prus, A., & Rewak, D. (2024). *XXX lat edukacji obronnej w Polsce – próba podsumowania szkolenia obronnego w Akademii Sztuki Wojennej*. *Wiedza Obronna*, 288(3), 1–37. <https://wiedzaobronna.edu.pl/index.php/wo/article/view/325/291>
- Psyk-Piotrowska, E., Kretek-Kamińska, A., Walczak-Duraj, D., & Zajda, K. (2013). *Struktura i uwarunkowania lokalnych grup działania kapitału społecznego*. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Quental, N., Lourenço, J. M., & da Silva, F. N. (2011). *Sustainable development policy: Goals, targets and political cycles*. *Sustainable Development*, 19(1), 15–29. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.424>
- Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa. (2024). *Alert RCB: National Early Warning System Overview 2024*. Warszawa. <https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb>

- Richardson, C. E. (2021, July 13). *Resilience interventions do work – why coping strategies should be a staple of education. The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/resilience-interventions-do-work-why-coping-strategies-should-be-a-staple-of-education-163973>
- Rogalewicz, M. (2022). *Cyberterroryzm jako zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego państwa*. Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Cyberbezpieczeństwa.
- Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa. (2025). *Krajowy Plan Zarządzania Kryzysowego*. <https://www.gov.pl/web/rcb/krajowy-plan-zarzadzania-kryzysowego>
- Sadowska, E. (2014). *Rozwój nauki o bezpieczeństwie. Analiza problemu*. W: M. Śliwa, A. Żebrowski, & R. Kłaczyński (red.), *Bezpieczeństwo RP. Wczoraj i dziś* (s. 292–302). Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego.
- Saryusz-Wolski, J. (2023). *Unia Europejska – oligarchiczne superpaństwo w budowie. Sieci*, 24(550). <https://wpolityce.pl>
- Schininà, G., Papadopoulos, R., & Saul, J. (2021). *Koncepcje i modele działania*. W: *Zdrowie psychiczne i wsparcie psychospołeczne w społecznościach w sytuacjach kryzysu i przesiedlenia* (s. 17–18). Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). <https://www.iom.int>
- Sienkiewicz-Małyjurek, K. (2024). *Jakie wyzwania towarzyszą budowaniu odporności społecznej? Uwagi wokół projektu ustawy o ochronie ludności i obronie cywilnej*. <https://www.batory.org.pl>
- Skolimowska, K. (2019). *Dyskursywne ujęcie tożsamości państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych*. *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, 55(1), 113–125.
- Skrendo, A. (2004). *Tożsamość w perspektywie konstrukttywizmu*. *Teksty Drugie*, 1–2, 65–77. https://rcin.org.pl/Content/52691/PDF/WA248_68602_P-I-2524_skrendo-tozsam.pdf
- Staniland, P. (2015). *Armed politics and the study of intrastate conflict*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(1), 30–43. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314563659>
- Stark, A., & Taylor, M. (2014). *Citizen participation, community resilience and crisis-management policy*. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 300–315.
- Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP. (2020). https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf
- Szydłowski, P. M. (2024). *Forecast of challenges...* *National Security Studies*, 33(3), 91–116.
- Trubalska, J. (2015). *Wybrane aspekty ochrony infrastruktury krytycznej w Polsce*. *Zeszyty Naukowe WSEI*, 5(1), 111–122.
- Trzciński, K. (2015). *Czym jest stabilność polityczna państwa? Przegląd Politologiczny*, 20(2), 31–42.
- Tschirgi, N., Lund, M. S., & Mancini, F. (Eds.). (2010). *Security and development: Searching for critical connections*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- UNDP. (2021). *A new understanding of civic trust in democratic transitions*. <https://www.undp.org>

- UNICEF ECAR. (2023). *Responding to the needs of Ukrainian refugee children in Poland*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>
- Urząd Gminy Piątnica. (2025). *Plan zarządzania kryzysowego Gminy Piątnica*. <https://gminapiatnica.pl>
- Urząd Gminy Warka. (2025). *Gminny plan zarządzania kryzysowego i Gminny Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego*. <https://warka.pl>
- Urząd m.st. Warszawy. (2025). *Plan zarządzania kryzysowego dla m.st. Warszawy*. <https://bezpieczna.um.warszawa.pl>
- Ustawa z dnia 16 listopada 2016 r. o zmianie ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku obrony RP. Dz.U. 2016 poz. 2138.
- Ustawa z dnia 26 kwietnia 2007 r. o zarządzaniu kryzysowym. Dz.U. 2007 nr 89 poz. 590.
- Ustawa z dnia 5 grudnia 2024 r. o ochronie ludności i obronie cywilnej. Dz.U. 2024 poz. 1907.
- Walczak, W. (2020). *Zarządzanie kryzysowe – rola i zadania organów administracji państwowej*. W: E. Kowalewska (red.), *Bezpieczeństwo w XXI wieku – aspekty społeczne i prawne*.
- Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R., & Kinzig, A. (2004). *Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems*. *Ecology and Society*, 9(2), Article 5.
- Webb, D., & Wills-Herrera, E. (Eds.). (2012). *Subjective well-being and security*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Wojakowska, M. (2020). *Budowanie odporności społecznej – szansa czy wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych*. W: M. Wojakowska & M. Gikiewicz (red.), *Kultura bezpieczeństwa społeczności lokalnych*, t. 1.
- Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej. (2025). *Operacja FENIKS: Szkolenia z zarządzania kryzysowego*. <https://media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl>
- World Economic Forum. (2016). *Risk and responsibility in a hyperconnected world*. <https://www.weforum.org/publications/risk-and-responsibility-hyperconnected-world-pathways-global-cyber-resilience>
- Zespół Strategicznego Przeglądu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. (2024). *Rekomendacje do Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP*. <https://www.bbn.gov.pl>